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Abstract
This paper will deal with how and in what ways (linguistic) computation as part of linguistic competence may relate to aspects of
culture in the context of the cognition which becomes viable by being grounded in the possible conjunction of mental 
computations and cultural praxis. The possibilities of cultural capacities are enormous across societies and/or cultures, but 
linguistic computations as have been postulated are restricted by the nature of constraints specific to natural language. The
purpose of this paper is to see the consequences of how these two can make cognition viable.
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1. Introduction
Culture and natural language are not simply a part of nature; rather they configure and in many ways, constrain
the very nature of human cognition. One often encounters debates on whether natural language is itself a part of 
culture or whether culture is a part of nature or not. These debates may be tangential to the issue of how language
within cognition relates to culture.  Now what does it mean for language (within cognition) to relate to culture if this
is what characterizes the fulcrum of issues revolving around mind, language and culture? Computation, on one hand, 
underlies the core operations buttressing linguistic (especially syntactic) constraints, principles/rules as crystallized
in Generative linguistics [1], [2] and elsewhere in theoretical linguistics. On the other hand, socialization processes
as part of the cultural praxis carry over to a notion of culture and cultural capacities though it is palpably visible that 
there is no way of having a transparently demarcated notion of culture. Placed in the context of our cognitive
substrate, (linguistic) computation and culture appear to be at odds with one another it is as if cognition is 
sandwiched between (linguistic) computation and culture. However, there is no way one can sidestep these issues if 
the purported goal is to probe the intricately knotted relationship between (linguistic) computation, mind and culture
even if the relationship between (linguistic) computation, mind and culture put together has a bewildering amount of
impermeability. This is more so because their ontological domains do not properly overlap although they
interpenetrate one another in other ways too. In such a situation, to make a theoretical/conceptual move is like
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ploughing on through the maze of abstractions, emergent layers of phenomena and a confounded plexus of relations. 
It is unclear how such a complicated network of relationships can be dealt with in a swoop with the relevant issues 
thoroughly addressed.  
Given this scenario, the current paper will make no attempt to build a theory of how the relationship between 
(linguistic) computation, mind and culture can be satisfactorily constituted and thereby defined. Nor will it pretend 
to resolve the complications each one presents when taken alone. Rather, it will try to figure out the points of contact 
at which (linguistic) computation, mind and culture come together but simultaneously do not even chime with each 
other in ways which sort of destabilize the very relationship, however postulated, between (linguistic) computation, 
mind and culture. It is believed that this exercise will be fruitful in the sense that this can help unravel some of the 
deeper but persistent puzzles and problems encompassing (linguistic) computation, cognition and culture in broader 
terms.  
The paper is structured as follows. The first section will discuss the relation between (linguistic) computation and 
cognition. The second section will shed some light on the construal of a relationship that may obtain between 
cognition and culture. The third section will focus on linguistic phenomena like long-distance dependency, gapping, 
presupposition etc. from a swathe of the territory of syntax and semantics to uncover the kind of recalcitrant 
messiness that emerges at the cross-section of (linguistic) computation, culture and cognition. And finally, the fourth 
section will briefly tease apart what the emerging puzzles and problems mean for any understanding of cognition, 
culture and language.   
2. (Linguistic) Computation and Cognition 
      The relation between (linguistic) computation and cognition is not as straightforward as it may sound though the 
way the relation between (linguistic) computation and cognition in theoretical linguistics has been projected makes 
it appear so. But before we plunge into the details of how that relation may be conceived of, the notion of 
(linguistic) computation needs to be clarified.  So when a question on whether something is computational or not is 
asked, much hinges on the fact that the right concept of computation is applied to the phenomenon that is to be 
scrutinized to see whether it falls under computation. Similar considerations apply to the case here as we focus on 
language and wonder what can be linguistic computation. For all the vagueness surrounding the notion of 
(linguistic) computation, it appears that (linguistic) computation fits well with the classical sense of computation 
where inputs are mapped to outputs according to some well-defined rules by means of symbolic manipulation of 
digital vehicles in the form of linguistic strings. Much of formal linguistics has employed this notion of linguistic 
computation implicitly or explicitly mainly because the representational vehicles of language are discrete in form. 
Still a question remains. Can we take linguistic computation as a generic computation that encompasses both digital 
and analog computation [3]? Even if this is a bit difficult to answer, the answer is more likely to be no. It is 
somewhat clearer that the digital notion of computation has been predominant all throughout the field of cognitive 
science, in general and theoretical linguistics, in particular; hence the analog sense of computation does not apply to 
linguistic computation since in analog computation computational processes are driven and determined by the 
intrinsic representational content of the vehicles which are analog in nature [4], whereas digital computation  
involves mappings of inputs onto outputs that are executed without any regard to the content-determining properties 
of the representational digital vehicles.  
     In the Generative linguistics framework linguistic representations are construed to be (internalized) mental 
representations, and operations on such representations by means of rule systems are computations. And these 
operations have to have an algorithmic character to be called computations; otherwise it does not make any sense to 
have operations which are posited to be computational in form and character. The core computational operation in 
the current version of Generative Grammar is Merge [1]. Merge is a binary operation involving two syntactic 
objects- say, . Now the operation Merge will merge  ሼ , 
object. An example can be given to illustrate this.  
 
John believes Mary to be beautiful.                                                                                                       (1) 
 
The way the words of the sentence in (1) have been combined to make the sentence (1) can be shown below with 
the help of a tree as standard in theoretical linguistics.  
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Fig. 1. Derivation of (1) through the operation Merge
Here the operation Merge builds the tree through an iteration of the application of the operation (with v denoting 
the verb phrase and T the tense phrase)
structure Merge has so far bui The rest has come
about through what is called External Merge. Now it needs to be seen whether this operation is a computational
operation or not. One may note in this connection that a function does not become a computable function just by
virtue of being a function as there are a lot of functions which are not computable functions. And a computable
function is generally the one which can be stated as an algorithm. If so, not all functions can be algorithmically
defined. However, it is easy to see that the operation Merge can be stated algorithmically. Here is how. First, Merge
can be stated in the form of a binary function that operates on S, the set of syntactic objects. So it will look like: 
Merge (S ൈ S) = S. Second, Merge in this form can be stated, by following Foster [5], as a sequence of transitions
between states of a machine-say, a Turing machine- each of which consists of a value and a label. This can be
shown below.
[SO1: LI1 SO2: LI2 L: ] [SO: LI1, LI2 L: ] [SO: {LI1, LI2} L: ] [SO: { LI1, LI2}] (2)
(2) represents a sequence of states. Here SOi is a syntactic object, LI is a lexical item (including functional
categories like tense T or verb v) and L is a label (of an SO). The left hand side of the colon represents a label and
the right hand side of the colon denotes the value of that label. Each structure enclosed within braces [ ] with such
label-value pairs constitutes a state followed by the next state- the arrows represent the relevant transitions between 
such states. One can see that the values of SO1 and SO2 have been grouped in the second state. This gives us a
handle to the representation of objects created by Merge as a pair, if needed. However, the next state gives us the set 
of values of SO1 and SO2 thus having the flexibility that one can choose either of the states (the second or the third)
as and when needed. This also gets us out of the necessity to impose any (in)determinacy on the syntactic objects
generated by Merge. 
Now that a characterization of how linguistic operations can be computational in nature has been arrived at.
Moreover, this is not just a way of building structures-syntactic structures. Building semantic structures can also be 
characterized this way. Semantic structures are built in a compositional manner in that the semantic structure of an
expression is a function of the semantic structures of the expressions that are parts of the whole semantic structure.
This insight has been a central theme of Montague Grammar and has been incorporated in formal semantics too. So
the semantic structure of the sentence (1) can be compositionally derived in the following fashion.
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Fig. 2. Compositional semantic derivation of the sentence in (1)
Here e represents an entity denoting a noun/noun phrase and t is truth value. The arrow represents the 
mapping/function from one semantic value to another. One can check that both e of the tree are 
cancelled out to give rise to t at the mother node and then t , finally
leading to a t at the top of the tree which is the semantic value of a proposition. This is what a compositional
semantic derivation looks like.  Additionally, the mapping/function from one semantic value to another is also a
computable function- that is, this function can be algorithmically described. This can be simply shown, as above, in
the form: [SV1: x  SV2: y ] [ SV: x,y] [ SV: <x, y>] when SV is a semantic value. Thus one can have a function like
f (x) =y when x and y denote semantic values, and complex functions can be constructed through function
composition. So far, linguistic operations have been shown to be computational separately for syntactic structures 
and semantic structures thereby leading someone to feel that operations on syntactic structures and semantic
structures are independently computational. But this is not quite true because semantic structures are always
deductively defined on the set of strings syntax generates. In fact, this can be clearly seen in Categorial Grammar [6]
where syntactic structure is just a medium for the derivation of semantic structures.
(1) in Categorial Grammar below. There are a set of primitive categories like N (noun), NP (noun phrase), S
(sentence). Any other complex category is derived through a combination of these primitive categories by means of
backward and/or forward slashes. The compositional rules via cancellation of categories are similar to the ones 
applied in Fig. 2. Since the slashes are mapping functions, they are sensitive to the order of application of functions
and can be algorithmically described in a way similar to what has been shown above. So one can see how semantic
composition piggybacks on syntactic structure building. This is more strongly visible in Dynamical Semantics [7].
So far so good. But how does this all relate to cognition? The link provided in Generative Grammar is via a kind
of psychologism grounded in the conception of a mental grammar constituted by a complex relation of rules,
representations and constraints. What this means is that when a language is acquired, what is acquired is not exactly 
a language but a grammar mentally instantiated and this allows the person to have a competence in the language by
virtue of having internalized the rules and constraints the grammar consists of. Though this link has been challenged
by Langendoen and Postal [8] on the ground that mathematical properties of natural language are such that they
militate against any psychologically grounded ontology of natural language, we will not pursue this line of thought.
Suffice it to say that a connection between computational operations underlying linguistic rules, constraints and our 
cognitive substrate has also been motivated on the basis of a conception of language as a module/a faculty of the
human mind.
468   Prakash Mondal and Ravi Shankar Mishra /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  97 ( 2013 )  464 – 473 
Fig. 3. Compositional semantic derivation of the sentence in (1) in Categorial Grammar
Other linguistic frameworks like Parallel Architecture [9] have also established a connection between language
and cognition by having distributed the interaction among the components of language-syntax, semantics and
phonology- in a way that each component as part of the faculty of language in mind has its own primitives,
combinatorial rules/principles, and constraints on the mutual correspondence among syntax, semantics and
phonology. Since structures in this framework are not intentionally defined and thus not about anything, this raises
the question of whether the combinatorial rules/principles in each subsystem of language and the constraints can be
computational or not. It may be, in principle, possible given the characterization of combinatorial rules/principles
and constraints, though the issue is best left open. Even if Montague Grammar or Categorial Grammar does not 
clearly make any commitment to any brand of psychologism, structure building process in Dynamical Semantics is
modelled on the interpretation process in mind and a similar tenet is also to be found in Discourse Representation
Theory [10]. Important to note in this connection is that fact that the link between operations governing linguistic
structures and cognition as postulated by these frameworks is extrinsic in the sense that structural operations in
Dynamical Semantics or Discourse Representation Theory are posited to parallel/match any computations that the
mind does in language processing but are not themselves identified with mental computations, however 
characterized. Overall, we get both logically intrinsic and extrinsic connections between linguistic computation and
cognitive computation.
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3. Culture and Cognition 
s perhaps easier to understand 
than definitionally demarcate it. The notion of culture carries over not just to a notion of environmental interaction 
of the individual, though that is definitely a part of it. It broadly encompasses a whole gamut of social processes, 
capacities, activities, humanly defined relations, conventions, norms and values and so on. One cannot certainly 
deny the role of symbolic forms mediating socio-cultural interactions and relations. Perhaps that is the reason why 
structuralist movement had such an impact in both sociology and anthropology. But the notion of symbolic forms 
does not merely incorporate linguality; rather it embraces the process of semiosis itself since at the heart of semiosis 
is interpretation, as propounded by Charles Sanders Peirce and Thomas Sebeok. One may see that this is what 
provides the (missing) link between culture and cognition. Cultural patterns are not just fluctuations in the social 
space, they have their unstably regular form-semiotic or otherwise. It is not just that culture changes along with or in 
reaction to the undulating conditions of discourse any more than the physical environment changes with the 
changing conditions of theories of ecology or of the biosphere.  
Perhaps there is more to it than meets the eye.  There may well be a lot of resistance from or constraints on the 
semiotic processes linking culture with cognition. One example might make this clearer. Marriage and kinship 
relations are socio-culturally constructed, but this does not license the implication that humans can/do conceptualize 
any vertical/horizontal depth in the form of a kinship mediated by marriage, birth, race or whatever. Thus even 
though a kinship that relates an individual A to B and B to C and hence A to C (a case of transitivity) or a kinship 
that relates an individual A to B and A to C and hence B to C (a case of euclideanity) is easier to conceptualize; but 
this does not mean that one can conceptualize, in daily interactions, any arbitrarily long chain of length n connecting 
any X to Y horizontally (transitively or symmetrically and so on) or vertically (any n-th order relation among 
relations).  
All the same, it is too simplistic to just show that all socio-cultural interactions are cognitively grounded. This is 
as trivial as saying that all cultural capacities are biologically mediated/grounded. It is quite the case 
construal or conceptualization mandates a kind of construction-discursive and/or social- exercising a causal efficacy 
through acceptance and efficiency [11]. A discursive construction is constituted by 
something becomes relevant for action on the part of the recipient (for example, abusing somebody). Social 
construction is more persistent and stable, and forms the macrostructure of understanding of a socially available 
target prevailing over and then transcending the boundaries of the discourse of its origin (learning how to make a 
pot, for example). But these are all ways of constraining the form socio-cultural interactions assume. Culturalization 
and socialization processes format the nature of cognition when humans learn and engage in language(s), 
mathematics, games, artistic activities etc. In fact, these are logically extrinsic orders of connection between culture 
and the cognitive substrate. It would be equally or perhaps more interesting to see whether cultural 
interaction/practices as part of the cultural praxis is/are not merely instantiated in but identified with cognitive 
processes or vice versa. This will give us the logical intrinsicality of cultural-cognitive processes/interactions. As we 
move on to the later sections, we will see that this question becomes sharper than can be appreciated at this juncture.  
4. At the Cross-section of (Linguistic) Computation, Culture and Cognition 
Now it is necessary to articulate what really matters to the relationship between (linguistic) computation, culture 
and cognition. To show this, we will consider a range of linguistic phenomena from areas of syntax and semantics. 
No attempt will be made to bring out a comprehensive treatment of the phenomena to be discussed in this 
connection. Rather, the relevant issues will be spelled out by having them positioned at the intersection of 
(linguistic) computation, culture and cognition. 
-distance dependency. The examples below show that any 
dependency should be local but long dependencies are possible as well in some circumstances. 
 
What does John think (that) he needed_?                                                                                                   (3) 
*Who/what did John ask why Mary looked for_?                                                                                         (4) 
What did she move out to buy some stuff from_?                                                                                        (5) 
*Which place did John meet a lot of girls without going to_?                                                                     (6) 
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The sentences in (3-4) show that Wh-movement or the dependency between the gap and the occurrence of the 
Wh-phrase should be local. In (3) the apparently long dependency between the gap and the occurrence of the Wh-
phrase is actually summed over smaller dependencies/movements (through the top layer of the embedded clause-the 
CP (complementizer phrase), while it is not so in (4) where the CP of the embedded clause already contains a Wh-
phrase. The sentence (6) is ungrammatical because of a long-distance dependency between the gap in an adjunct and 
the Wh-phrase; but interestingly (5) is fine even though there exists a long-distance dependency between the gap in 
an adjunct and the Wh-phrase. Cases like these have puzzled linguists and have led to the refinement of much of the 
technology in the Generative linguistics paradigm. It is because if a dependency/movement is posited to be local, it 
is mysterious why some dependencies/movements are sometimes possible (as in 5) and sometimes banned (as in 6) 
when the establishment of locality through successive cyclic movement/summing over smaller dependencies is 
controlled.  
To solve this problem, one proposal made by Truswell [12] states Single Event Grouping Condition which 
requires, in the case of a long distance dependency of a Wh-phrase, two events described in the matrix verb phrase 
and the adjunct clause/phrase to form a macro-event with the events (and sub-events) overlapping spatiotemporally 
and at most one of the events from either the matrix verb phrase or the adjunct clause/phrase having an agentive 
character. Two events form a macro-event (joint/extended event) only if they have a causal (direct or enabled) 
relationship and the causing event precedes the one caused. This explains why (5) is fine but (6) is banned as the 
events in the matrix verb phrase and the adjunct clause/phrase in (5) form a macro-event while those in (6) do not 
( is not agentive in having not occurred at all). Since such a condition 
obtains at the interface between syntax and semantics, it is computed in cyclic manner at each step of the verb 
phrase building process in syntax. If so, it would be interesting to see how this works in a situation where the issues 
involving (linguistic) computation, culture and cognition come out clearly. 
 we have a program P (which is run on a machine, say, a version of the Turing machine-
plausibly in the human mind) that can determine which event causes which out of the two events in a sentence 
containing the matrix verb phrase and the adjunct clause/phrase. Additionally, it can also determine which event has 
an agentive character. Now two sentences the agentive character of 
events to determine which event causes which out of the two events in a sentence his program P determines 
which event causes which out of the two events in a sentence to check causal relations and the agentive character of 
events are given simultaneously as input to P. In such a situation, the program P determines that the event, say e1, 
in the matrix clause of the first sentence is the event that causes the one, say e2, in the adjunct clause and hence the 
two events form a macro-event. But when the program moves over to the second sentence, the relationship is 
reversed and it is e2 that causes e1. The problem for the program is that now both e1 and e2 mutually cause each other 
and thus none precedes the other. If so, technically there does not seem to be a problem for the long-distance 
dependency formation of a Wh-phrase when moved to the front (as far as Single Event Grouping Condition is 
concerned) in that the events in each sentence form a macro-event. But then the paradox that arises is this: on one 
hand, the program P determines that e1 causes e2 and thus the first sentence can allow Wh-extraction from the 
adjunct satisfying Single Event Grouping Condition but the same program then finds that e2 causes e1 in the second 
sentence, and thus this violates Single Event Grouping Condition (the precedence relation among events must not be 
symmetric). So the program finds that long-distance dependency formation of a Wh-phrase is possible for each 
sentence taken alone and at the same time, not possible for any. 
To solve the problem posed by the paradox above, one may argue that the program P will differentiate the events 
in the first sentence with some index i from those in the second sentence with some index j. One possibility is to 
index each event or pair of events in a sentence differently from any other events in other sentences. If so, this gives 
rise to another paradox. One can note that each of the sentences is about the program P itself. Now P determines that 
e1 causes e2 given that P itself checks causal relations and the agentive character of its behavior first and then this 
results in the determination of what causes what. But when P goes over to the second sentence, P finds that e3, a new 
event causes e4, another new event given that determination of what causes what eventuates in the checking 
of the causal relations and the agentive character of its own behavior. Now in this situation, P determines that   
Single Event Grouping Condition is not violated in each sentence but still violated in each (again because of 
symmetric precedence of events)! One cannot appeal to truth in this case since the program P does not have access 
to any relation in which truth/non-truth may obtain. Even if P has access to the truth about itself, P determines, upon 
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checking the first sentence, that the causal/contingent relation between the events e1 and e2 (when e1 causes e2) is 
true of its behavior. Next, it goes over to the second sentence and determines that the causal/contingent relation 
between the events e3 and e4 is false given its behavior observed during the reading of the first sentence but true on 
the basis of the structure of the second sentence (if the adjunct rationale clause is the resulting event). That is a 
contradiction! But have not we also stated that e1 3, e2 3, e1 4 and e2 4? If so, then this leads to another 
level of contradiction in that even though it is the case that e1 3, e2 3, e1 4 and e2 4, the events e2 and e3 refer 
to the same thing and so do the events e1 and e4 and on the basis of this fact P finds something to be true of its own 
behavior (upon reading the first sentence) and at the same time, false too (upon reading the second sentence). This is 
how all this begets one paradox after another when (linguistic) computation applies to cognition.  
We shall now concentrate on another phenomenon- Here we have two 
sentences with the verb missing (when matched in interpretation with the one in the matrix clause) in the second 
conjunct of each of the sentences (7-8). 
 
John wants to build a tower and Mary, _ a bridge.                                                                                         (7) 
*John wants to erect a structure and Mary, _ a structure.                                                                               (8) 
 
 The ungrammaticality of (8) shows that the object of the missing verbs needs to be the FOCUS (contrastive 
focus- by virtue of being contrasted with the object noun phrase of the matrix clause against the common ground 
. Overall, this is how gapping has been dealt with [13], [14]. 
determine which phrase is the FOCUS since this is what turns out to be crucial in the 
examples of gapping above
or Sony wants to destroy a structure and Amy wants to erect Upon reading the first major 
sub-
second major conjunct, it determines 
 destroy
 the common 
this is a contradiction! To pull G out of the paradox, one may argue that G may scan each major conjunct separately 
and index the FOCUS and the common ground. Even if this is allowed, this will not save G from getting bogged 
down in another paradox. Here is how. Now suppose the sentence (7) in a form before the deletion 
build hile scanning this sentence, G will determine that there is no common ground and there is no 
FOCUS in any of the conjuncts when independently checked. If so, there is no gapping in (7), but at the same time, 
there is a gapping in (7), as a matter of fact! Because of such contradictions, G will either halt or loop forever.  
There is yet another phenomenon to be dealt with here. It is presupposition. Presupposition is like conventional 
implicature derived from the meanings implicated in a phrase/clause. This can be illustrated with the following 
example. 
 
Johni is looking at the picture of hisi dead mother                                                                                            (9) 
Philipk regrets that hek hates John.                                                                                                                    (10) 
               
The sentence (9) ied while the sentence (10) presupposes 
that Philip hates John. There is a well-known literature on how presupposition can be computed from sentences 
[15], [16], [17]. For example, the principle Maximize Presupposition [16] states that in a situation when p is the 
case, the strongest presupposition q out of all the choices {q, r, s, 
considers (10) if it is the case that Philip hates John, no such presupposition can be derived from a sentence like 
 since regretting holds true in more restricted conditions than mere opining. Be 
that as it may, what is relevant for our purpose is that presupposition can be derived from their sentences of origin 
by seeing how meanings of expressions are composed and what they (conventionally) implicate. We may now 
proceed to another example to unpack the relevant insights into the relationship between (linguistic) computation, 
culture and cognition.  
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They believe that  land has a glossy look.                                                                                          (11) 
They know that  land has a glossy look.                                                                                             (12) 
 
The sentence (11) has the presupposition that Robin has/owns a piece of land whereas (12) contains the 
which lands do not belong to individuals, rather individuals or groups of individuals belong to the land. That is 
indeed the case in many cultures across the world (as in, for example, Australian aboriginals). What happens in such 
d to be computed from (11) by 
some program in the mind of such a person (having a native competence in English) would be that Robin, just as 
others in his surrounding culture do, belongs to a land a certain piece of which he happens to stay in and/or to 
simply live off. But the dilemma is that the presupposition that Robin has/owns a piece of land is supposed to be 
logically derived from this sentence and still not derived. If the purported linguistic computation in the mind is not 
sensitive to any conceptual/semantic/pragmatic content, any such program will get ensnared in a dilemma.  
But as far as our experience is concerned, humans go about exploring their world, handle, produce and 
understand such expressions with whatever presupposition that comes forth in the relevant context. That is what 
makes cognition viable. If that is not what takes us so far, what if we push all feasible 
conceptual/semantic/pragmatic content into the computational space of a mental program computing linguistic rules 
and constraints? Needless to say that, such a move would be computationally intractable as the frame problem in 
glossy look is valid based on the na
knowledge is claimed to be justified true belief, knowledge pretty much works like belief in many ways when we 
shape and thereby are shaped by the socialization processes. Knowledge is extrapolated not merely from epistemic 
processes (objective observation) but also from cultural practices (norms, values); therefore it is not always 
n revolves 
at from different spatiotemporal and phenomenological scales.). 
In point of fact, the vector of the problem goes so deep that it transpires that the problems may have a liaison 
with the socio-cultural world that we co-construct and co-construe. In such a constitution, we often wallow in 
circular causality manipulated through our socio-cultural praxis as the paradoxes and contradictions emerging in 
connection with the phenomenon of long-distance dependency show us. For example, as we humans engage with 
the world, we mold, shape and manipulate symbolic capital (like wealth, honor, knowledge etc.) to respond to the 
socially constituted matrix of expectations, beliefs and practices [18]. But it is equally true to say that humans 
respond to the socially constituted matrix of expectations, beliefs and practices to mold, shape and manipulate 
symbolic capital (which becomes codified and objectified through that very stream of the intentional act of 
responding). Cognition grows in and with this reciprocal structuring of representational contours which, through that 
co-dependent growth, constitutes the very becoming of cognition itself. This is further related to how we 
intentionally ground our language processing in the wider realm of the socio-cultural praxis, which may have 
engendered the paradoxes with gapping too. What all else means can now be briefly drawn up below. 
5. Final Remarks 
Mainstream theoretical linguistics has long maintained that linguistic representations are (internalized) mental 
representations, and operations on such representations by means of rule systems are computations. This connects 
language to the human mind and computation. Beneath all this lie a number of deep-seated assumptions about the 
connection between language, cognition and computation. This paper shows that there does not appear to exist any 
determinate, coherent and consistent way in which computations can be both cognitive and linguistic or cognition 
cannot be both cultural and computational if grammars for natural languages are assumed to be mentally represented 
in a non-intentional manner. That is, if the mentally represented grammar is supposed to be not an intentional object, 
this invites fiendish and formidably recalcitrant paradoxes, puzzles and inconsistencies at points of contact of 
grammar, culture and cognition. This has been demonstrated here by way of examination of a number of standard 
and familiar linguistic phenomena such as Wh-movement, gapping, presupposition. More poignantly, this strongly 
473 Prakash Mondal and Ravi Shankar Mishra /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  97 ( 2013 )  464 – 473 
indicates that the notion of interpretation applied to syntactic and semantic phenomena cannot be the notion of a 
frozen entity that comes attached to syntactic/semantic objects in that interpretation often as a cultural process of the 
mind creeps into everything syntactically and semantically constructed, and by virtue of that, interpretation cannot 
be both a form of (mental) computation outside of the architecture of grammar and a part of syntactic/semantic 
objects in linguistic constructions. Thus it also transpires that computation, especially digital computation, applied 
to mental operations over linguistic structures is either vacuous if employed in its general algorithmic sense or is full 
of inconsistencies if juxtaposed with mental interpretation in the context of the cultural scaffolding of cognition. The 
present work argues that these problems arise because of certain unacknowledged assumptions about intentionality, 
interpretation, mentality and computation 
If human cognition is ultimately viable, that is what makes us re-think where culture and language (dis)place 
each other. If it turns out that computation is also one of the ways of intentional grounding made viable by 
language-culture co-construction, the exact relations in terms of which language, computation and culture are 
manifested, instantiated and thus project realizational possibilities with respect to one another become more 
convoluted than has been so far assumed.   
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